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“AFFORDABLE HOUSING” AS METAPHOR 
Steven J. Eagle* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the varying and often-conflicting meanings and 
goals ascribed to the term “affordable housing.”  It asserts that the term 
often serves as a metaphor; it obscures rather than clarifies, and 
contributes to the intractability of problems pertaining to housing from any 
perspective.  The Article further asserts that attempts to deal with what are 
termed affordable housing issues must realistically take into account the 
shelter, cultural, and economic needs of various populations, and also the 
effects of housing decisions on economic prosperity.  Above all, the 
affordable housing metaphor is agreeable precisely because it defers 
responding to the need to make hard choices about priorities and funding. 
Among proffered affordable housing goals are making available an 
ample supply of housing in different price ranges; attracting and retaining 
residents who contribute to the growth and economic prosperity of cities; 
and ensuring that neighborhood housing remains available for existing 
residents, while preserving their cultural values.  Other goals include 
providing adequate housing in high-cost cities for low- and moderate-
income individuals and families, and the overlapping concern for “fair 
housing” for persons of all races and backgrounds. 
After considering these often conflicting goals, the Article examines the 
benefits and detriments of various means of providing more affordable 
housing, including fair-share mandates, rent control, and inclusionary 
zoning (including whether that leads to impermissible government takings 
of private property).  It then briefly considers the merits and demerits of 
federal subsidy programs. 
The Article briefly considers conceptual and practical problems in 
implementing the Supreme Court’s 2015 Inclusive Communities disparate 
impact holding and HUD’s 2015 regulations on “Affirmatively Furthering 
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Fair Housing,” especially in light of the 2016 elections.  Finally, it 
discusses how the concept of “affordable housing” conflates the separate 
issues of high housing prices and poverty and how housing prices might be 
reduced through removal of regulatory barriers to new construction. 
Throughout, the Article stresses that advancing affordable housing goals 
has both explicit and implicit costs and that goals often are conflicting.  To 
those ends, it employs economic, sociological, and legal perspectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article asserts that what commonly is called the problem of 
“affordable housing”1 has largely been intractable because it is a conflation 
of many separate societal problems and goals.  Affordable housing is a 
metaphor invoked by diverse interest groups to define issues and choices in 
their favor, so that they might more effectively attempt to shape public 
policy. 
Metaphors, according to George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, “can have 
the power to define reality . . . through a coherent network of entailments 
that highlight some features of reality and hide others.”2  They add that 
“acceptance of the metaphor, which leads us to focus only on those aspects 
of our experience that it highlights, forces us to view the entailments of the 
metaphor as being true . . . .”3 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman utilized the similar organizing 
principle of the “decision frame,” which they defined as “the decision-
maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated 
with a particular choice.”4  While the frame is “controlled partly by the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. There is an extensive legal literature on affordable housing. See, e.g., BRUCE KATZ 
ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST., RETHINKING LOCAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGIES: 
LESSONS FROM 70 YEARS OF POLICY AND PRACTICE (2003); J. Peter Byrne & Michael 
Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy:  The Matrix Revealed, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (2007); Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s 
Contributions to Both Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 
585, 593 (2015); Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing:  
Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (2004). 
 2. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 157-58 (1980). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981). 
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formulation of the problem,” it also is controlled “partly by the norms, 
habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.”5 
In more pithy language, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler observed that 
Tversky and Kahneman “didn’t care for metaphors.”6  “They replace 
genuine uncertainty about the world with semantic ambiguity.  A metaphor 
is a cover-up.”7 
This Article attempts to bring “genuine uncertainty” to the fore of the 
affordable housing debate.  It discusses how decisions about where people 
live, the identity of their neighbors, the types of amenities they might 
enjoy, and regional prosperity are interrelated in multifaceted ways.  The 
apparently intractable shortage of “affordable housing” in many American 
cities results from inconsistent housing goals and the lack of a societal 
consensus on how to prioritize and fund the advancement of these goals.  It 
further asserts that “affordable housing” should be defined and analyzed in 
a broad context, taking into account the shelter, cultural, and economic 
needs of various populations, as well as the effects of housing decisions on 
economic prosperity.  This definition is broader than the more conventional 
emphasis on housing for low- and moderate-income families.8  However, a 
broader view permits a more realistic, comprehensive, and effective 
approach toward housing issues. 
The Article focuses on three different affordable housing goals.  One is 
developing an ample supply of housing in price ranges that attract and 
retain residents conducive to the growth and economic prosperity of cities.9  
Two major problems are that governments have created extensive barriers 
to the creation of new housing at the behest of existing residents10 and that 
the concept of “affordable housing” has different meanings for middle-
class families, moderate-income families, and poor families. 
A second affordable housing goal is ensuring that neighborhood housing 
remains available for existing residents, while preserving their cultural and 
other non-pecuniary values.11  This goal is associated with resistance to 
gentrification in minority and lower-income neighborhoods and resistance 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, The Two Friends Who Changed How We Think 
About How We Think, NEW YORKER (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com
/books/page-turner/the-two-friends-who-changed-how-we-think-about-how-we-think 
[https://perma.cc/JRV3-CTAC]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 1 (focusing on housing opportunities for 
low-income persons within the context of a comprehensive set of goals that such housing 
might achieve). 
 9. See infra Section I.D. 
 10. See infra Section II.F. 
 11. See infra Section I.E. 
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to densification and concomitant environmental concerns in more upscale 
areas.  More generally, neighborhood preservation often is in opposition to 
economic growth. 
Finally, “affordable housing,” in its most familiar sense, refers to the 
provision of adequate housing in high-cost cities for low- and moderate-
income persons and the overlapping concern for “fair housing” for families 
of all races and backgrounds.12  Governments have long made special 
provisions for housing, since the provision of physical shelter and a locus 
for intimate family relationships serves fundamental needs.13  But this 
raises many questions, such as whether affordable housing not only 
encompasses safe and adequate shelter but also neighborhood integration, 
economic and cultural opportunity, and equal dignity.  It is important to 
come to grips, as well, with the essential conflation of housing 
unaffordability and poverty.  As leading urban economists have flatly 
stated, “a housing affordability crisis means that housing is expensive 
relative to its fundamental costs of production—not that people are poor.”14 
The lack of a societal consensus on the importance and priority of 
housing objectives tends to perpetuate the status quo.  The most direct 
government responses to affordable housing needs, massive government 
housing subsidies and substantially increased residential density, are 
politically unpalatable.  This encourages local government responses 
marked by a lack of transparency, logrolling, inefficiency, opportunities for 
favoritism, and disregard for private property rights. 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of “disparate 
impact” analysis in fair housing determinations in Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project15 and 
HUD’s subsequent promulgation of rules on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
Housing,”16 it is likely that the federal judicial and executive branches will 
become more immersed in local housing decisions.  But that might place 
the federal government in the role of closely supervising local land-use 
practices more generally, a role it has resisted in other contexts.  It is highly 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See infra Sections II.C and II.E. 
 13. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 1, at 529. 
 14. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions on 
Housing Affordability, 9 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 21, 21 (2003), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/03v09n2/0306glae.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7FXB-5AYB]. See Glaeser & Gyourko, infra note 375 and accompanying 
text for a more extensive quotation. 
 15. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (upholding the use of “disparate impact” as a test for 
determining if local housing regulations or actions violate the Fair Housing Act). 
 16. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.). 
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problematic that President Donald J. Trump or HUD Secretary Ben Carson 
would support this approach.17 
Many solutions to narrow aspects of the affordable housing problem 
seem tenable in theory, although perhaps not in practice.  Without a broad 
change in political will leading to a consensus on goals and priorities, more 
comprehensive solutions will remain elusive.  In approaching affordable 
housing issues, it is important to recall, as the central theme in well-known 
books by Jonathan Haidt18 and George Lakoff19 demonstrate, that people of 
good will have different moral frameworks, as well as different life 
experiences. 
I.  THE DIVERSE GOALS OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
A. The Purposes of the City 
Affordable housing, however defined, must be evaluated in the context 
of the purposes that the city is to serve.  Should cities primarily facilitate 
religious or social values, the production of goods or economic 
transactions, or consumerism?20  One beginning point is that they should 
facilitate human values and the nurturing of families.21  However, in our 
disparate society, these are political problems with no clear answers.  The 
eminent mid-twentieth century political scientist Harold Lasswell did not 
define “politics” in terms of rational decision-making based on 
comprehensive data.  Rather, as the title of his classic book, Politics: Who 
Gets What, When, How,22 suggests, politics is a practical contest for power, 
with elites having a very substantial advantage.  That does not mean, of 
course, that those who have little political power and who feel displaced 
from home or community yield gracefully. 
In dealing with affordable housing, it is tempting to be ruled by abstract 
and overarching principles, applicable to broad populations and geographic 
regions.  However, as Jane Jacobs wryly noted in The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities,23 a “region” might be defined as “an area safely 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See infra Section II.E. 
 18. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY 
POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012). 
 19. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 
(2016). 
 20. To be sure, decisions involving cities often have substantial spillovers, and there 
often are mismatches between the legal decision-making powers of cities, suburbs, regional 
authorities, state governments, and their relative competencies to deal with problems. See, 
e.g., Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515 
(2007).  These issues generally are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 21. See JOEL KOTKIN, THE HUMAN CITY: URBANISM FOR THE REST OF US 5-18 (2016). 
 22. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936). 
 23. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). 
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larger than the last one to whose problems we found no solution.”24  This 
insight pertains to housing, as well.  Economic prosperity, community 
cohesiveness, societal fairness, and government transparency and honesty 
are discrete problems for which we have not found good solutions.  
Combining them under the rubric of top-down edicts for “affordable 
housing” is unlikely to be more successful.  On the other hand, modest 
efforts, building upon a Burkean notion of incremental change, might be 
more prudent and ultimately desirable.25 
Questions about what kind of city we want imply assumptions about 
whether decisions are to be made by individuals or collectively by 
government.  In considering private actors, this Article assumes that 
decisions are made by developers acting largely as proxies for their 
ultimate residential purchasers and by existing homeowners to maximize 
some combination of pecuniary value and subjective desires.  In 
considering government decision-making, this Article assumes 
participation by tenants, businesses, environmentalists, and other local, 
regional, and state interest groups, as well as by owners and developers.  
This multiplicity of stakeholders attenuates government concerns about 
future residents.  Navigating the system of government permits and 
subsidies, thus, makes developers more attuned to political deal-making 
and rent-seeking than to pleasing prospective purchasers.26 
There is no necessarily ideal model for the American city.  David 
Brooks recently noted that two types of urban places in America seem to be 
functioning well.  The first are “dense, highly educated, highly communal 
places . . . . These cities, like Austin, Seattle and San Francisco, have lots 
of innovation, lots of cultural amenities, but high housing prices and lots of 
inequality.”27  The second are “opportunity cities like Houston, Dallas and 
Salt Lake City.  These places are less regulated, so it’s easier to start a 
business.  They are sprawling with easy, hodgepodge housing construction, 
so the cost of living is low.  Immigrants flock to them.”28 
Brooks urged that there be a debate between these “two successful ways 
to create prosperity, each with strengths and weaknesses.  That would be a 
forward-looking debate between groups who are open, confident and 
innovative.”29  The debate “might divide by cultural values and aesthetics, 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 410. 
 25. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1993) (1790) (advocating incremental political change arising from a society’s 
customs and traditions, as opposed to sweeping reforms based on theory). 
 26. See infra Sections II.D, II.F. 
 27. David Brooks, Where America Is Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2016, at A23. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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[but] wouldn’t divide along ugly racial lines.”30  In public exchanges, alas, 
issues involving personal aspirations, social class, race, and substantial 
illiquid housing investments typically do not readily lend themselves to 
reasoned debate.  We often do not ask others to understand and try to 
accommodate our needs and desires as fellow citizens and neighbors but, 
rather, engage in “rights talk,” demanding that others yield to our alleged 
legal entitlements.31 
Thus, our dialogue often proceeds not through civil discourse but, rather, 
through the promulgation of ordinances and regulations demanding either 
densification or large-lot zoning, lawsuits objecting to development 
approvals based on often-ostensible environmental concerns, and judicial 
challenges to community growth that disparately affect legally protected 
groups, without regard to intent.  Recourse to the legal system, for better or 
worse, often imposes substantial additional expense and delay.32  Those, or 
their threat, often are sufficient to sink a residential development project.33 
Where individuals make choices regarding their own residences, the 
aggregate of their separate decisions weighs heavily on overall housing 
patterns and availability.  As Thomas Schelling demonstrated with respect 
to “neighborhood tipping,” individual choices interact in ways not 
necessarily anticipated, or even desired, by the people involved.34  
Furthermore, prospective new residents are the most sensitive to 
neighborhood characteristics, and possible buyers often look carefully at 
the racial and socioeconomic makeup of neighborhoods.35 
B. Costs are Constraints 
Individuals often express preferences for all of the following: 
inexpensive housing, economic vibrancy and growth, and maintenance of 
existing neighborhood values and ways of life.  “Neighborhood values,” in 
turn, might include resisting gentrification and supporting institutions 
furthering the ethnic and cultural needs of lower-income groups.  
Conversely, they might include maintaining the low densities and high 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. (alteration in original). 
 31. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991) (noting that foreign observers are struck by the extent to which legal 
discourse and lawyers have permeated and influenced American ways of life). 
 32. See, e.g., Lisa C. Goodheart & Karen A. McQuire, Revisiting the Issue of Causation 
in CERCLA Contribution Litigation, 82 MASS. L. REV. 315, 322 (1998) (noting the “great 
expense, delays and other burdens associated with protracted environmental litigation”). 
 33. See infra notes 382-85 and accompanying text for a vivid example. 
 34. Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC. 
143, 181-86 (1971). 
 35. See Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, (Pub. L. and Legal Theory, 
Working Paper No. 575, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2762026 [https://perma.cc/L3VH-U6EW]. 
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amenities favored by more upscale communities.  Such preferences 
typically are articulated without apparent regard for their inconsistent 
nature, or the burdens they impose upon others. 
Thus, even before examining various affordable housing goals, it is 
necessary to inject the concept of costs.  No less than goods denominated 
as “free,” goods termed “affordable” often have high implicit costs.36  
“Costs,” as economists use the term, refers to the “highest-valued 
opportunity necessarily forsaken” in order to obtain the good in question.37  
While “costs” often are identified as the pecuniary value of goods traded in 
markets, the concept is broader than that and includes subjective 
tradeoffs.38  When individuals make decisions for themselves, it generally 
is assumed that they accurately judge their relative likes and dislikes, 
although a considerable literature has developed in recent years asserting 
that they make systematic errors.39 
Some scholars dismiss the distinction between normative and positive 
economic analysis and assert that economics cannot be value-free40 and 
that the provision of affordable housing sometimes is linked to moral 
obligation.41  However, regardless of one’s views about the objectivity or 
subjectivity of economics, in a world of scarce resources, “economic actors 
cannot pursue every course of action with positive expected value” but, 
instead, “must make decisions by comparing the value of alternatives.”42  
                                                                                                                 
 36. See, e.g., DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING (2005) (asserting 
that mandatory parking requirements result in excessive land set aside for parking and are 
triggered by concerns of existing homeowners and businesses that newcomers otherwise 
would occupy scarce public parking spaces, which are a public good only because 
municipalities insufficiently charge for their use). 
 37. See Armen A. Alchian, Cost (1968), reprinted in ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC 
FORCES AT WORK 301 (1977). 
 38. See Karen I. Vaughn, Does It Matter That Costs Are Subjective?, 46 SOUTHERN 
ECON. J. 702 (1980). “[C]ost is an all pervasive concept that reaches to the core of economic 
thinking.  Economic decision making is an exercise in choosing among alternatives, and 
cost can only be understood to be a personal subjective evaluation of the consequences of 
choice.” Id. at 702. 
 39. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 40. See, e.g., THE END OF VALUE-FREE ECONOMICS (Hilary Putnam & Vivian Walsh 
eds., 2012). 
 41. See, e.g., Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but 
Limited Power and Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 
346-47 (2001) (asserting that providing urban families access to affordable suburban 
educational, employment, and other opportunities “serves the national and moral goal of 
increasing equality of opportunity”). 
 42. Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 51, 78 (2015). 
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Alas, with housing, as with the environment, considerations are 
interrelated.43 
C. Residents of American Cities are Burdened by High Housing 
Costs 
Recent reports suggest that urban rents often create hardships for 
residents.  According to a 2016 Furman Center study, “[i]n both 2006 and 
2014, a majority of renters in all but three of the largest metro areas were 
rent burdened, meaning their rents were equal to at least 30 percent of their 
income.”44  The study also noted that “[i]n all but four of the largest metro 
areas, at least a quarter of renters were severely rent burdened in 2014, 
meaning they faced rents equal to at least half their household income.”45 
Perhaps notably, of the eleven largest metro areas, Dallas and Houston 
were the only two to be more affordable than metros nationwide.46  A 2016 
National Low Income Housing Coalition study stated, 
[I]n no state, metropolitan area, or county can a full-time worker earning 
the prevailing minimum wage afford a modest two-bedroom apartment.  
In only twelve counties and one metropolitan area is the prevailing 
minimum wage sufficient to afford a modest one-bedroom apartment.47 
The squeeze between rising rents and low incomes has particularly affected 
minority and low-income neighborhoods.48 
Similarly, the National Low Income Housing Coalition concluded that 
“[w]hile stagnant wages for lower-income workers are contributing to 
rental affordability challenges, the findings suggest a dearth of low-cost 
supply is also a culprit.”49  “Of 370,000 multifamily rental units completed 
from 2012 to 2014 in 54 U.S. metropolitan areas, 82% were in the luxury 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 91 (Sierra Club Books 1988) 
(1911) (“When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in 
the universe.”). 
 44. Ingrid Gould Ellen & Brian Karfunkel, Renting in America’s Largest Metropolitan 
Areas, NYU Furman Center/Capital One National Affordable Rental Housing Landscape 
Research Study 21 (Mar. 8, 2016). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. Out of Reach 2016, NAT’L LOW HOUSING COALITION 1 (2016), http://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/oor/OOR_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XLN2-VUTD]. 
 48. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation’s 
Housing 2015, (2015), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/jchs-sonhr-
2015-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y4S-DFC9] (noting a 2014 housing market “fueled” by 
more renter households, but in which “the number of housing cost-burdened renters set 
another record,” and “a number of minority and low-income neighborhoods remain severely 
distressed”). 
 49. NAT’L LOW HOUSING COALITION, supra note 47, at 1. 
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category, well out of reach for low-income earners.”50  Furthermore, “[i]n 
more expensive cities, the numbers are particularly daunting.  A family in 
the San Francisco metro area would need to earn nearly $35 an hour to 
afford a one-bedroom apartment and $44 to afford a two-bedroom 
apartment.”51  These numbers do not take into account unreported work in 
the “informal economy.”52 
While affordable housing concerns often focus on low- and moderate-
income individuals and families, large segments of the middle class are 
affected as well.  A 2016 Pew Research Center report noted that the middle 
class is shrinking in most American cities, to the extent that “it may no 
longer be the economic majority in the U.S.”53  The report added that “the 
national trend is the result of widespread declines in localities all around 
the country.”54 
Despite highly publicized concerns that education debts present a unique 
impediment to home purchase for college graduates, young people without 
college degrees face large hurdles to achieving home ownership.55 
According to Brookings Institution scholars Elizabeth Kneebone, Carey 
Nadeau, and Alan Berube, “[t]here also is evidence that, as poverty has 
increasingly suburbanized this decade, new clusters of low-income 
neighborhoods have emerged beyond the urban core in many of the 
nation’s largest metro areas.”56  The poor in the suburbs often are 
concentrated in lower-income communities, with little access to middle-
class amenities or opportunities, yet lacking safety-net resources more 
readily available in urban areas.57 
Thus, in the wake of the Great Recession, homeowners have become 
tenants, financially squeezing lower-income tenants in metropolitan areas.  
                                                                                                                 
 50. Laura Kusisto, No Relief in Sight for Minimum-Wage Renters, WALL. ST. J., May 25, 
2016, at A2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires From Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373 
(2006) (discussing conceptual and practical problems regarding the nature of “work” and 
societal support for those earning undisclosed income). 
 53. Pew Research Center, America’s Shrinking Middle Class: A Close Look at Changes 
Within Metropolitan Areas (May 11, 2016) (citing Pew Research Center, The American 
Middle Class Is Losing Ground: No Longer the Majority and Falling Behind Financially 
(Dec. 2015)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kusisto, supra note 50. 
 56. Elizabeth Kneebone, et al., The Re-Emergence of Concentrated Poverty: 
Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s, BROOKINGS INST. 19 (Nov. 2011), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/11/03-poverty-kneebone-nadeau-berube/1103_pov
erty_kneebone_nadeau_berube.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DKF-X63W]. 
 57. Id. 
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This results in personal hardship and also affects area economies, as will be 
discussed next. 
D. Affordable Housing as Conducive to Economic Prosperity 
In each of its varying meanings, good arguments are made that 
affordable housing is conducive to economic prosperity.  However, as 
always, there are significant tradeoffs. 
1. Housing Attracting and Retaining Productive Residents 
Unnecessary restrictions on new housing in economically vibrant areas 
raise housing prices, which discourages productive workers from moving 
in or remaining and harms the regional and national economies.  Those 
were important conclusions of a recent study of the role that housing prices 
and availability play in attracting and retaining skilled and talented workers 
by Professors Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti.58 
Their intent was to study how the economic growth of individual cities 
determined the growth of nations.  Hsieh and Moretti used a research 
model in which workers were free to move and where local labor demand 
reflects factors like “infrastructure, industry mix, agglomeration 
economies, human capital spillovers, access to non-tradable inputs and 
local entrepreneurship” that affect the overall productivity of firms.59  They 
added that the “local labor supply reflects amenities and housing supply.”60 
After exploring the relationship of productivity and wages in various 
cities, Hsieh and Moretti noted that, “if labor is more productive in some 
areas than in others, then aggregate output may be increased by reallocating 
some workers from low productivity areas to high productivity ones.”61  
However, in very productive cities, higher productivity was reflected in 
higher nominal wages rather than in productive workers moving in.  They 
discussed, as an example, Silicon Valley, where natural amenities could be 
preserved while stringent land-use regulations governing “underutilized 
land within its urban core” could be relaxed so that the housing supply 
could be “greatly expanded.”62  “Our findings indicate that in general 
equilibrium; this would raise income and welfare of all US workers.”63 
Thus, Hsieh and Moretti concluded: 
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[T]hree quarters of aggregate U.S. growth between 1964 and 2009 was 
due to growth in Southern U.S. cities and a group of 19 other cities.  
Although labor productivity and labor demand grew most rapidly in New 
York, San Francisco, and San Jose thanks to a concentration of human 
capital intensive industries like high tech and finance, growth in these 
three cities had limited benefits for the U.S. as a whole.  The reason is that 
the main effect of the fast productivity growth in New York, San 
Francisco, and San Jose was an increase in local housing prices and local 
wages, not in employment.64 
Similarly, Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag concluded that the United 
States is “increasingly characterized by segregation along economic 
dimensions, with limited access for most workers to America’s most 
productive cities.”65  As an example of this phenomenon, Edward Glaeser 
noted that the Houston area is gaining population at a rate much faster than 
the New York area, although New Yorkers are better educated and have 
higher wages.  While home prices in New York and other major coastal 
cities are unaffordable for average workers, prices in Houston are not.66 
2. Adequate Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families 
Buttresses Economic Growth 
Workforce housing has become an important part of the affordable 
housing landscape.  The term describes “housing that is affordable to 
working families and individuals who do not qualify for housing 
subsidies.”67  Through workforce housing initiatives, including 
“inclusionary zoning laws, a reduction in regulatory barriers, the creation 
of housing trust funds, the provision of ‘gap funding’ measures, and 
incentives for employer-assisted housing initiatives,” some localities have 
tried to respond to the need for firefighters, teachers, and other employees 
to commute for long distances.68 
According to Professor Tim Iglesias, “[t]he public appeal of such 
programs is the functional necessity of these workers for the city’s 
harmonious operation and the consequent need to enable these workers to 
live within the jurisdiction.”69  Politically, of course, this appeals to 
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homeowners and other taxpayers because the beneficiaries will be 
preforming services they need and also because the beneficiaries’ status as 
gainfully employed helps shield them from the stigma of being undeserving 
of assistance. 
3. Gentrification as Conducive to Prosperity 
The often-maligned phenomenon of gentrification also is an engine for 
urban prosperity.  While the damage to existing neighborhood ways of life 
that result from gentrification will be discussed subsequently,70 it is 
important to note that the gentrification of existing neighborhoods provides 
both neighborhood business opportunities and places of residence for 
productive workers who otherwise might relocate to other cities.  Professor 
J. Peter Byrne conceded that individuals have been displaced through their 
loss of affordable apartments, but asserted that “increases in the number of 
affluent and well-educated residents is plainly good for cities, on balance, 
by increasing the number of residents who can pay taxes, purchase local 
goods and services, and support the city in state and federal political 
processes.”71 He added: 
My contention here goes somewhat further: gentrification is good on 
balance for the poor and ethnic minorities.  The most negative effect of 
gentrification, the reduction in affordable housing, results primarily not 
from gentrification itself, but from the persistent failure of government to 
produce or secure affordable housing more generally.  Moreover, cities 
that attract more affluent residents are more able to aggressively finance 
affordable housing.  Thus, gentrification is entitled to “two cheers,” if not 
three, given that it enhances the political and economic positions of all, 
but exacerbates the harms imposed on the poor by the failures of national 
affordable housing policies.72 
Explicit disagreement with Professor Byrne’s assessment has not so 
much challenged his view of gentrification as conducive to economic 
development as it has the notion that communal values should be 
subordinated.73 
4. Preservation of Existing Close-Knit Communities Can Abet Prosperity 
While gentrification is conducive to economic prosperity, preservation 
of existing neighborhoods, although providing primarily social and cultural 
benefits for existing residents, has economic development aspects as well.  
“Many ethnic inner city neighborhoods in US cities are rich in traditions, 
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history, art, and cuisine,” but also suffer the effects of decline.74  “In the 
face of a growing popularity of cultural tourism, an opportunity exists to 
explore how neighborhood cultural assets can be used to promote economic 
development in such neighborhoods.”75  The difficult challenge is to obtain 
the economic advantages of tourism while maintaining neighborhood 
authenticity. 
E. Affordable Housing as Supportive of Existing Community 
One goal of affordable housing is strengthening the ability of people to 
remain and thrive in their existing communities.  However, the term 
“community” elides the deep divisions between universality and 
particularity.  As the political theorist Michael Walzer noted, communities 
are marked by their character as “historically stable, ongoing associations 
of men and women with some special commitment to one another and 
some special sense of their common life.”76  Professor Kenneth Stahl added 
that, “the very notion of community, however broadly conceived, is 
dependent on exclusion.”77  He attributed the NIMBY (“not in my 
backyard”) impulse as “merely an outward manifestation of this deeply 
embedded and widely shared desire to preserve community.”78 
The tension between abiding by the wishes of existing residents and 
mandating change to benefit potential newcomers permeates affordable 
housing issues.79 
1. Social Capital 
On a physical level, existing communities are built of infrastructure, 
commercial and institutional buildings, and residences.  But what makes 
communities and holds them together is social capital.  In his well-known 
book Bowling Alone,80 sociologist Robert Putnam noted that, “[w]hereas 
physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to 
properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among 
individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them.”81 
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Social capital often is considered in the contexts of low-income and 
minority communities resisting gentrification and of more affluent 
communities resisting change.  However, a community need not be 
affluent, nor fear affluence, to resist change.  For instance, leaders of the 
remnant of the Orthodox Jewish community on New York City’s Lower 
East Side have resisted the construction of affordable housing in order to 
help keep their community intact.82 
Despite the promise of the notion that affordable housing will bring 
disparate groups together, melding and strengthening their social capital, it 
might actually be problematic.  Professor Robert Ellickson is skeptical.83  
He discussed Putnam’s newer publication, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and 
Community in the Twenty-First Century.84 
After reviewing the vast literature on the consequences of the integration 
of neighborhoods, particularly by race and ethnicity, Putnam comes to 
sobering conclusions.  He asserts that residents of diverse neighborhoods 
have less social capital than do residents of more homogeneous 
neighborhoods.  Moreover, the members of an ethnic group who live in a 
relatively integrated neighborhood are likely to have weaker ties to other 
members of their own ethnic group than they would if they lived in an 
ethnic enclave.  Putnam affirms his support for integration, but he is 
compelled by his findings to shift his emphasis to the long-term benefits 
of neighborhood diversity.85 
Other less-publicized studies similarly cast doubt on the traditional view 
that economic integration gives rise to significant social benefits.  Ellickson 
also discussed Philip Oreopoulos’ finding that growing up in a poor 
neighborhood does not, by itself, lead to worse outcomes for children, and 
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his results indicate that a child’s household environment has a far greater 
effect than a child’s neighborhood environment.86 
2. Gentrification as Harmful to Community 
“Gentrification” generally has come to be understood to be “the process 
by which higher income households displace lower income [households] of 
a neighborhood, changing the essential character and flavor of that 
neighborhood.”87  It has been referred to as “changing the character of a 
neighborhood from one that reflects distinct ethnic and class needs and 
cultural traditions into a bland emporium for expensive consumer goods.”88  
As Judge Higginbotham observed, “[t]his process often causes the eviction 
of the less affluent residents who can no longer afford the increasingly 
expensive housing in their neighborhood.”89  This definition is not 
dissimilar from what apparently was the first usage of the term 
“gentrification” in 1964 by Ruth Glass.90  She used the term to describe 
[T]he “invasion” of members of the middle and upper classes into 
traditionally working-class neighborhoods, resulting in the displacement 
of incumbent residents and a change of the social character of the 
neighborhood.  This definition can be broken down into two interrelated 
components.  First, gentrification raises the economic level of a 
neighborhood population.  Second, gentrification changes the ‘social 
character’ or culture of neighborhoods.91 
What has been styled the “chaos and complexity of gentrification”92 
results from the fact that some scholars have attempted to ascertain the 
existence of gentrification through quantitative data, while others have used 
qualitative data, which is much richer, but results in complex, 
multidimensional definitions.93  However it is measured, Judge 
Higginbotham described gentrification as a “deceptive term” masking the 
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“dire consequences” to “less affluent residents who bear the brunt of the 
change.”94 
A consequence of gentrification is the “displacement of low-income 
renters who are unable to afford rental price increases, those evicted by 
landlords who want to upgrade the building for a new clientele, [and] low-
income homeowners unable to afford increased property taxes . . . ”95  
Eviction, in turn, can lead to substantial and prolonged deprivation.96 
In light of these negative effects, Professor Jon Dubin has advocated “a 
right to protective zoning in low-income communities of color.”97  This 
right would resist “noxious commercial or industrial uses which undermine 
the quality of the residential environment and discourage continued 
residencies.”98  Dubin added: 
Higher-grade zoning, zoning or planning measures that induce certain 
higher-quality residential or other uses can produce similar incompatible 
and disruptive results.  These higher-cost uses create market pressures that 
effectively price out existing low-income residents through the process of 
gentrification.  Residents subjected to incompatible upzoning face the 
prospect of involuntary displacement and the functional and 
psychological trauma of dislocation and perhaps homelessness.99 
Likewise, Professor Erika Watson has argued that urban school districts 
implement certain reforms to attract white middle-class gentrifiers by 
giving them more viable high-quality options.100  However, such reforms 
“harm poor and minority students by disproportionally displacing them 
from their neighborhood public schools while simultaneously limiting the 
number of quality public and charter schools available to them.”101 
Professor Peter Byrne’s generally positive view of gentrification, quoted 
earlier,102 has been challenged on grounds that he exalts pecuniary values 
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over community values and views gentrification “through a decidedly 
white, upper-class, market-driven lens.”103  Overall, gentrification is a good 
example of what Joseph Schumpeter termed the process of “creative 
destruction,” whereby innovation results in benefits to society at the cost of 
eliminating outmoded structures and products.104  In the context of 
affordable housing, the merits and demerits of community development are 
manifold, subtle, and intermixed.105  Unfortunately, substantial theoretical 
and practical challenges have so far prevented efforts to quantify or 
prioritize in an objective manner the increases and decreases to human 
welfare that result or how those gains and losses should best be 
distributed.106 
3. Middle or Upper-Middle Class Way of Life 
Just as the metaphor of “gentrification” signifies displacement of a 
culture and way of life of racial and ethnic minorities and lower-income 
individuals, terms such as “densification,” “environmental degradation,” 
“apartments in residential neighborhoods” and the like signify 
displacement within the frame of reference of a middle- or upper-middle-
class way of life.  A century ago, the rise of the automobile and the ensuing 
enhanced mobility for ordinary people was a powerful motivator for the 
spread of zoning.107  The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was 
adopted in New York City at the behest of Fifth Avenue merchants, who 
were anxious to shield their clientele from teeming immigrants working in 
new high-rise loft buildings nearby.108 
In the seminal case upholding comprehensive zoning, Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co.,109 Justice Sutherland gratuitously explained that 
apartment houses (then often “tenements”) “come very near to being 
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nuisances”110 and that “very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, 
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive 
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”111  Indeed, 
homeownership is widely assumed to bring numerous advantages to the 
community, including civic participation,112 although this approach 
recently has been disputed.113 
Professors Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin have described that the 
financial stakes of homeowners are important in describing the extent to 
which they will be civic-minded and cooperative.114  They note that the 
home is the single largest financial asset of most homeowners and that 
because the home is a highly undiversified investment, they are quite 
concerned about the risk of loss.115  What they term “understaked” 
households are in danger of losing their homes through foreclosure or 
gentrification; “overstaked” households, more typical of upper-income 
groups, resist change that would harm their investments.  To a greater or 
lesser extent, “[a]ll homeowners have an incentive to stop new housing 
because if developers build too many homes, prices fall, and housing is 
many families’ main asset.”116  Ultimately, Fennell and Roin suggest both 
over- and under-investment in individual homes create conflicts and pit 
communities against each other.117 
Consistent with those concerns, a recent study found that “[i]n areas 
where affordable housing developments are viewed as an amenity, higher 
income households are willing to pay more for proximity.  Conversely, 
higher income households are willing to pay more to live further away 
from affordable housing developments in areas where such properties are 
viewed as a disamenity.”118 
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In recent decades, the disengagement of the upper middle class from the 
more extensive community might have substantially increased.  Richard 
Reeves has argued that “[t]he American upper middle class is separating, 
slowly but surely, from the rest of society.”119  Whereas “the top fifth have 
been prospering while the majority lags behind . . . [,] [g]aps are growing 
on a whole range of dimensions, including family structure, education, 
lifestyle, and geography.”120  Also, “[s]egregation of affluence not only 
concentrates income and wealth in a small number of communities, but 
also concentrates social capital and political power.  As a result, any self-
interested investment the rich make in their own communities has little 
chance of ‘spilling over’ to benefit middle- and low-income families.”121 
The cutting edge of this class-based separation appears to involve the 
quest by affluent parents for neighborhoods with excellent schools.  While 
wealthy parents are pouring money into enrichment programs for their 
children, “[t]he biggest investment the rich can make in their kids, 
though—one with equally profound consequences for the poor—has less to 
do with ‘enrichment’ than real estate.”122  Such parents “can buy their 
children pricey homes in nice neighborhoods with good school districts.”123 
Indeed, for some home buying parents who are willing to commute 
extreme distances, “there is no factor more important than the public 
schools their children will attend.”124 
Recent research by sociologist Ann Owens examined income 
segregation from 1990 to 2010 in America’s hundred largest metropolitan 
areas and concluded that income segregation among childless households 
had “changed little and is half as large as among households with 
children.”125  She noted: 
Rising income inequality provided high-income households more 
resources, and parents used these resources to purchase housing in 
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particular neighborhoods, with residential decisions structured, in part, by 
school district boundaries.  Overall, results indicate that children face 
greater and increasing stratification in neighborhood contexts than do all 
residents, and this has implications for growing inequalities in their future 
outcomes.126 
The fact that high incomes are correlated with separation in residential 
and cultural patterns should come as no surprise.  Neither should the fact 
that, while people pay obeisance to all having equal starts in life, they work 
to provide advantages to their own children.  In an era of meritocracy, 
where income from professional achievement far outstrips income from 
inherited wealth, it likewise is no surprise that “[e]ducation-as-inheritance 
crowds out education-as-opportunity.”127 
While the term “meritocracy” was coined as a satire on the British 
educational system128 and neglects the structural impediments to 
opportunity faced by many,129 most Americans understand that term to 
describe the United States, “a place where those most deserving of power, 
wealth, and influence will succeed through innate aptitude and hard work.  
Conversely, those lacking natural talents will fail under the weight of their 
own inadequacies.”130  This, perhaps even more than the self-interest of 
some, describes why the value system of many Americans looks askance at 
fairness as equality and why achieving a societal consensus willing to 
sacrifice for low- and moderate-income housing assistance would be so 
difficult.131 
II.  EXPLORING SOLUTIONS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROBLEMS 
As previously noted,132 methods of providing more affordable housing, 
however the term is defined, come replete with explicit and implicit costs.  
Indeed, many aspects of the affordable housing problem reflect that those 
who might benefit from affordable units do not have the ability to buy or 
rent them.  This might simply be a function of the individuals not being 
able to afford the cost of erecting or rehabilitating the units.  However, it 
might also be a function of regulatory barriers created by zoning and other 
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government restrictions or of racial or class prejudice, perhaps manifested 
through the actions of local officials. 
Houston, which epitomizes the free market approach, has little in the 
way of land-use controls and inexpensive housing.  San Francisco, which 
epitomizes heavy government regulation, has extremely high housing 
prices and an affordability crisis.  Whether San Francisco regulations are 
“artificial,” or Houston’s laissez faire approach is indifferent to the general 
welfare, depends on one’s perspective. 
A. Expert versus Market Decision-Making 
For economists such as Robert Nelson, zoning functions as a property 
right, giving neighborhood residents “a collective property right to their 
common neighborhood environment.”133  On the other hand, for Charles 
Haar, the specification in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act that 
zoning be “in accordance with a comprehensive plan”134 was crucial.135 
As described by Professors Roderick Hills and David Schleicher,136 
“Haar took properly planned zoning to be a communal effort to wrest 
control of a community’s development away from land-use markets—what 
he called ‘the evil of uncontrolled growth’ and the ‘principle of profit 
maximization.’”137  The comprehensive plan would be the standard against 
which courts would weigh the local legislature’s small-scale zoning 
changes.  “This quality of trumping local zoning laws gave plans their 
‘constitutional’ status.”138 
Yet planners have come to realize that social interactions and changes in 
technology make land use dynamic so that planning should have a time 
frame of, perhaps, five years and twenty-five years, at most.139  Also, 
professional planners bring their own biases to their work, including 
favoring dense central business districts, multi-family housing, and open 
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space.140  It is not professional expertise that gives rise to the legitimacy of 
land-use planning, Professor Carol Rose observed, but, rather, the intimate 
knowledge that local legislators have of their constituents’ values and 
needs.141  Furthermore, planners have no particular ability to presage 
community needs in the future.142 
Combining the legitimacy of local elected officials and the knowledge 
implicit in markets, economist William Fischel advocated that officials and 
developers bargain over the conditions under which specific projects might 
be built.143  Charles Tiebout advanced a different view of the bargaining 
model, describing how localities compete for residents and tax monies.144  
Under the “Tiebout hypothesis,” individuals and communities alike take 
into account the benefits, as well as the costs, associated with the 
individual’s potential entry into the polity.  Potential residents consider the 
menu of services and amenities to be found in each locale and offset those 
by taxes to be paid and disamenities incurred.  Some localities might 
prosper by offering low services and low taxes or, conversely, high services 
and high taxes.  However, municipalities decidedly discourage or zone out 
those who would pay low taxes and demand expensive services, such as 
low-income families with many children who have to be educated.  The 
Tiebout hypothesis has been criticized as failing to take into account that 
changes in a community’s tax base “will be offset by an equal and opposite 
change in another community’s tax base.  And any increase in the number 
of children in the community’s public schools will be offset by an equal 
and opposite decrease in school enrollment somewhere else.”145 
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B. Some Affordable Housing Issues 
1. Is Housing a Right? 
The U.S. Supreme Court effectively held in 1972 that there is no 
Constitutional right to housing.146  “Because housing has been denied 
fundamental right status with its attendant strict scrutiny standard of 
review,” Professor Ann Burkhart noted, “federal and state courts routinely 
have rejected attempts by the poor to obtain adequate shelter despite the 
extremely hard facts that these cases often present.”147  On the other hand, 
several international treaties and declarations have embodied a right to 
housing,148 and housing has been defended as a basic human right.149  It is 
in the context of housing as a “basic human need” that subsidized housing 
for the poor has been defended as preferable to simple wealth transfers.150  
That said, in the United States, “the private sector may choose to 
participate in developing affordable housing, but it rarely does so unless the 
state provides deep discounts.”151 
Responding to suggestions from international organizations that 
everyone should have secure housing tenure and be free from forced 
evictions,152 Professors John McGinnis and Ilya Somin noted that such 
provisions might have their place in a regime of government-provided 
housing.  “We do, however, believe that it is clear that a housing system 
that depends on private enterprise, including contractual freedom between 
renters and owners, has virtues and should not be limited by international 
fiat.”153 
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2. Affordable Housing and Fair Housing 
The problem of affordable housing for low-income and minority groups 
relates broadly to the role of communities.  Concerns about income and 
social class seem indelibly mixed with concerns about race and ethnicity, 
both as a proxy for other issues and as a discrete and separate factor.  
“Neighborhood tipping” plays an important role.154 
According to Professor James Kushner, the nature of urban communities 
changed after World War II.155  Massive movements to the suburbs, 
together with strict racial segregation, marked the period through 1968.  
During the next phase, through 1975, there was “hyper-sprawl, the loss of 
the central city economic base and population, and hyper-segregation.”156  
The subsequent period, through 1990, was “characterized by class 
segregation, increased cost to access the suburbs, and increased class and 
racial separation.”  Thereafter, through 2008, urban communities 
“witnessed hyper-segregation; voluntary class, racial, and ethnic 
separation; and persistent racial discrimination.”157 
In her article The Fair Housing Choice Myth, Stacy Seicshnaydre 
examined “why racial segregation persists in residential neighborhoods 
despite the fact that the nation codified the policy of equal housing 
opportunity over four decades ago.”158  She noted that, regardless of 
income or crime rate, “[a]s the number of minorities in a neighborhood 
increases, it becomes increasingly undesirable to whites, particularly if the 
minority residents are black or Hispanic.”159  Perhaps concomitantly, 
“people of color perceive overwhelmingly white neighborhoods as 
unwelcoming or hostile; they thus gravitate towards neighborhoods that 
have already achieved some integration.”160 
In terming the lack of HUD enforcement of fair housing a “missing link” 
between law and real housing opportunity, Seicshnaydre declared “HUD 
must do more than dismantle ghettos and allow local governments to 
decide whether to provide housing choice.”161 
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In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision upholding the use 
of “disparate impact” as a test for housing discrimination in Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project162 and HUD’s subsequent promulgation of rules on “Affirmatively 
Furthering Fair Housing,”163 many new developments undoubtedly will 
occur.164 
3. Is Income Inequality in Cities Undesirable? 
While income inequality within cities sometimes is berated, it is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  Douglas Rae has argued that “[t]hose of us who 
want better life chances for low-earning households in major cities should 
set out to increase inequality by attracting and keeping high earners, now 
greatly underrepresented in central city populations.”165  Similarly, then-
outgoing mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “suggested New Yorkers would 
benefit if the income gap were even wider because the wealthy pay for a 
big portion of city services.”166  The very wealthy, he added,  
are the ones that pay a lot of the taxes.  They’re the ones that spend a lot 
of money in the stores and restaurants and create a big chunk of our 
economy . . . [a]nd we take tax revenues from those people to help people 
throughout the entire rest of the spectrum.167 
4. Should We Benefit People or Benefit Places? 
As Professor Kenneth Stahl noted, “[p]erhaps one of the most pressing 
issues for city governments today is whether they best serve their 
constituents by focusing on people or on places.”168  The view that 
government assistance should be directed toward individuals has two bases.  
The first, as summarized by Stahl, is that we can “alleviate poverty by 
issuing housing vouchers to enable the urban poor to escape from 
devastated ghettos, and deter criminality with crackdowns that emphasize 
the draconian consequences of poor choices.”169 
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Stahl states as an additional advantage that those with “decreasing 
attachments to particular places” might be “lure[d]” by cities “with high-
quality services and amenities.”170  But the authorities he cites for that 
proposition mostly emphasize how prospering cities can attract talented 
people, most of all those Richard Florida calls the “creative class” and not 
those in need of affordable housing assistance.171  To the extent that 
strivers have been attracted to prosperous American cities in the past, it is 
primarily because they have sought opportunity in areas with higher 
incomes.172 
Notably, Professor John Mangin has observed that, in recent decades, 
the highest growth rates are in regions with income below the national 
median, and “the regions with the highest incomes have been growing 
more slowly than the national average.  The most likely culprit is that, for 
the first time in American history, people are migrating toward low housing 
costs rather than toward high incomes.”173  Providing government benefits 
to low-income individuals, instead of places, can help them to relocate to 
parts of the country with better job and social opportunities.174  
Presumably, discerning better opportunities would take housing costs into 
account. 
Advocates that government aid should benefit places, as Stahl notes, 
“believe that urban policy must be directed at strengthening the 
communities that shape people’s lives rather than treating community as a 
disposable consumer good.”175  To be sure, people are ineluctably products 
of their environment so that “people cannot improve their fortunes simply 
by fleeing bad neighborhoods for good ones because, in an important sense, 
‘neighborhoods choose people’ rather than the reverse.”176  More 
practically, low-to-middle income people often are reliant on nearby family 
and friends for assistance and do not readily have the capital to establish 
themselves elsewhere, especially without a guaranteed job at the 
destination city.  Also, the political process that provides affordable 
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housing and other assistance is itself heavily place-based and gives little 
support to funding that would facilitate a move out of town. 
A similar argument for place-based assistance is made by Professors 
Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade: 
Our results show that affordable housing development has large welfare 
impacts as a place based policy, which more than offset the welfare 
impacts to tenants living in affordable housing.  Given the goals of many 
affordable housing policies is to decrease income and racial segregation in 
housing markets, these goals might be achieved by investing in affordable 
housing in low income and high minority areas, which will then spark in-
migration of high income and a more racially diverse set of residents.177 
Low-income neighborhoods can benefit from government-sponsored 
enterprise zones, redevelopment, Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”) and 
similar programs.178  In addition, spatial public goods, such as safety, 
education, and transit, can help as well.  However, improvements in city 
neighborhoods make them more attractive to newcomers, and the market 
value of those amenities is capitalized into real estate values.  Owners of 
apartment buildings, other commercial properties, and homeowners are the 
beneficiaries.  Residential and commercial tenants are not benefitted and 
might face displacement through gentrification. 
Whether our decision frame is predicated on “distressed communities” 
or “distressed cities” greatly affects ensuing public policy choices. 
5. Housing Affordability for Different Income Groups 
In a political and social context, “affordable housing” might be framed 
as a middle income family’s ability to buy a home in a “good” 
neighborhood, a working class family’s ability to rent an apartment in an 
area with civic associations and decent schools, or a low income family’s 
ability to reside in a habitable apartment in a secure area.  These 
generalizations are inherently incompletely defined and contestable. 
Should affordable housing include social equality, cultural amenities, 
and opportunities for advancement for all?  Complicating this issue is the 
fact that housing in excess of minimal shelter is what Fred Hirsch termed a 
“positional good,”179 one which we value not for its intrinsic merit but 
because others don’t have it.  Reviewing Professor Robert Frank’s Falling 
Behind,180 Thomas Leonard noted that Frank’s “big idea” is that the 
consumption of positional goods “leads to expenditure arms races that 
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make all consumers of the positional good worse off.  In other words, when 
what we want depends upon what others have, a consumption externality 
arises, and getting what we want will be inefficient.”181  Leonard adds that 
“status hunger is in genes,” and cites the example of owners who prefer 
homes of 3000 square-feet where their neighbors have only 2000 square-
feet, as opposed to having homes of 4000 square-feet, where the neighbors 
have homes of 6000 square-feet.182 
The problem of whether government-incentivized affordable housing for 
lower-income groups should provide the dignity and status for which their 
wealthier neighbors pay large sums is epitomized by the recent “poor door” 
controversy in Manhattan.183  Market-rate buyers in a luxury high-rise 
condominium pay up to $25 million for their units, for which they expect 
amenities such as “concierge service, entertainment rooms, and 
unobstructed views of the Hudson River and miles beyond.”184  As the New 
York Times noted, “[t]he project will also cater to renters who make no 
more than about $50,000.  They will not share the same perks, and they 
will also not share the same entrance.”185  The fact that low- or moderate-
income families might have separate entrances, street addresses, and 
amenities has split advocates for affordable housing.  Some argue for 
equality of persons and others for practical accommodations leading to the 
construction of more affordable units.186 
The same issue is presented more broadly in connection with the 
location of affordable and adequate housing units in areas both with and 
without neighborhood cultural, educational, and other amenities.  Professor 
Tim Iglesias has noted that the legislative history of the federal Fair 
Housing Act described the goal of “integration” being “truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.”187  He delineated two models of integration, the 
“traditional integration model” and the “individual access to the 
opportunity structure model.”188 
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While the “traditional” model focuses on the racial and socioeconomic 
makeup of a given area and the relationship of the people who live there, 
the second model “focuses on how location of a household relates to the 
‘opportunity structure’ of a community (e.g. good schools, good jobs, 
decent shopping, healthy neighborhoods, etc.).”189  As applied to the “poor 
door” controversy, Iglesias observed that comingling of residents was 
important under the “traditional” model but that, for the “access to 
opportunity” model, it is a location that facilitates access to good schools, 
jobs, and the like that counts.190 
An important distinction between the traditional and opportunity 
structure models is how they should regard extensive and efficient 
metropolitan transport networks.  Housing built on relatively inexpensive 
land in the metropolitan periphery is inherently more affordable but might 
bring to mind the banlieues of Paris, the favelas of Brazil, or similar 
isolated racial or ethnic areas in the outskirts of large American cities.  
Using a traditional view of integration, such construction would be most 
problematic.  On the other hand, with the important proviso that an 
adequate transportation system be available, housing in such areas would 
have easy access to the cultural, educational, and employment opportunities 
that the “opportunity structure” demands.191 
Provision of such a transportation infrastructure would not be easy.  In 
addition to the high cost of environmental review and physical 
construction, a sufficient legal infrastructure would have to be created.192  
At present, the New York City subway system is dominant in American 
heavy rail metropolitan transit systems, and its ridership has grown in 
recent years, while ridership elsewhere in the U.S. has declined.193  The 
Community Development Project has concluded that the “documented 
benefits” of better transit and smart growth include “providing affordable 
housing for residents with low income around major transit stops; 
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increasing community access to jobs, services, and amenities.”194  It warns, 
however, that other impacts include “increased housing prices, 
neighborhood gentrification, . . . and fewer opportunities for affordable 
housing developers who are priced out of the market.”195 
While crediting NIMBYism as an effort to preserve community,196 
Professor Stahl argues that “inclusion is an equally essential component of 
community,” and that “if we desire a community that features housing for 
all socioeconomic classes, we may have to accept some degree of class 
segregation within the community.”197  He deems the “challenge of 
inclusion” the attempt “to determine how much segregation is necessary to 
achieve a diverse and inclusive community.”198  Stahl suggests that a 
“[diverse] municipality as a federation of [homogeneous] neighborhoods” 
might be better than an attempt at “granular-level integration.”199 
Do Americans, in fact, “desire a community that features housing for all 
socioeconomic classes”?  Individuals affirming that sentiment might seek 
to relocate to integrated communities, perhaps taking advantage of public 
incentives and private donations to do so.200  Where legal mandates are 
concerned, it might be difficult to discern whether the voters regard them as 
merely aspirational or to be implemented elsewhere, as opposed to directly 
affecting their own communities (be they municipalities or neighborhoods).   
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that communities are pulling 
apart.  As Robert Putnam noted in his most recent book, Our Kids: The 
American Dream in Crisis,201 in the 1950s there were “decent opportunities 
for all the kids in town,” but now kids in poorer areas “can barely imagine 
the future that awaits the kids” in wealthier neighborhoods.202 
6. Are People and Places Distinguishable? 
Just as Robert Sampson’s work demonstrated that people are the product 
of their places,203 so are places the product of their people.204  While it is 
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tempting to say that uplifting communities exist and that people would 
enjoy better life prospects by moving to them, Professor Lee Anne Fennell, 
referring to “participant assembly problems,” asserted that people don’t just 
come to an attractive place; rather, people are the place.205  The notion of a 
successful place refers to the benefits from agglomeration of 
complementary resources, such as the firms in a specialized industry and 
workers skilled in its crafts.206 
Urban interaction space can be conceptualized as a type of commons.  It 
presents the threat of overcrowding or overharvesting, but it also poses 
the risk of undercultivation if it fails to attract parties who are well suited 
to generate agglomeration benefits.  The method for rationing access to 
prime urban space should, therefore, select not only for the value that 
users place on locating in particular spots, but also for those users’ 
agglomeration-friendly and congestion-mitigating traits . . . . The 
challenge is to assemble participants together whose joint consumption 
and production activities will maximize social value.207 
This point is important, because it makes more explicit that the 
Tieboutian model of competition among localities for new residents 
potentially extends far beyond the tax monies such residents might supply 
or demand.208 
C. State and Local Land-Use Mandates 
State and local land-use laws affect types and supply of housing in 
general and, particularly, the availability of affordable housing.  As an 
example, such local requirements as large-lot zoning benefit existing 
residents, since the “market value of each homeowner’s property will rise 
as the lot size minimum is increased.”209  Those prospective buyers 
subsequently finding houses in the community unaffordable will “bid[] up 
housing prices wherever they go.”210 
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,211 Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion broadly upheld comprehensive zoning.  He pronounced  
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the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building 
of a particular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether a 
particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined . . . by considering it in 
connection with the circumstances and the locality.212   
The trial judge whose decision was reversed was more blunt as to the 
municipality’s intent: “The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate 
the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it.  In the last 
analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and 
segregate them according to their income or situation in life.”213 
Indeed, municipal explanations for zoning as necessary to “preserve the 
character of the neighborhood” may well be “a code for the desire to 
preserve economic, ethnic and racial homogeneity.”214  Nevertheless, in 
light of the difficulty of implementing fair housing requirements under 
federal law,215 efforts to resist invidious discrimination thus far have been 
left largely to individual states.216 
1. Affordable Housing Fair Share Mandates 
An early embodiment of affirmatively furthering affordable housing was 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Mount Laurel doctrine,217 which was 
decreed exclusively under state law.218  Mount Laurel I was premised on 
the state’s zoning powers being legitimately invoked only if consistent with 
the state’s general welfare.  The court held housing to be a fundamental 
right and required every developing municipality to provide a “realistic 
opportunity” for a fair share of its region’s affordable housing needs.  In 
the subsequent absence of progress by Mount Laurel and other New Jersey 
municipalities in implementing those principles, Mount Laurel II provided 
much more detailed requirements.  The Mount Laurel mandates were made 
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applicable to all municipalities, with three judges to be designated to 
develop a methodology for assigning numerical requirements for every 
locality and to hear all Mount Laurel cases and a “builders remedy” put in 
place so that a plaintiff’s parcel would enjoy the fruits of Mount Laurel 
rezoning rather than the local legislature rezoning land belonging to 
someone else.219  Mount Laurel III ratified a political compromise with the 
Legislature, whereby Mount Laurel enforcement would be transferred to a 
new administrative Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”).220  
In 2015, in Mount Laurel IV,221 the court noted that COAH’s rules 
governing municipal housing obligations expired in 1999, that the agency 
had failed to promulgate updated rules, and that the futility of seeking 
administrative relief justified immediate access to the courts.  In 2017, the 
court declared that “[f]or the last sixteen years, while [COAH] failed to 
promulgate viable rules creating a realistic opportunity for the construction 
of low- and moderate-income housing in municipalities, the Mount Laurel 
constitutional affordable housing obligation” did not go away.222  It held 
that “under the current circumstances, the present-need analysis must be 
expanded to guarantee municipal compliance with the Mount Laurel 
doctrine.”223 
In words both celebratory and wistful, Robert Holmes, who was well-
steeped in the process, wrote that the Mount Laurel doctrine “is among the 
most significant contributions ever made to the advancement of affordable 
housing . . . . In effect, the court went beyond what any state or federal 
court had done prior to 1975 or has done since.”224 
Some other states have cited the Mount Laurel doctrine in cases or in 
developing statutes discouraging exclusionary zoning.  In New Hampshire, 
the Supreme Court adopted a less stringent version of the builders remedy 
but not numerical quotas.225  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted from 
the requirement in Mount Laurel I that an ordinance could not 
presumptively foreclose the possibility of affordable housing in holding 
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that a township ordinance limiting apartments to eighty of the community’s 
11,598 acres is exclusionary.226  Massachusetts and Connecticut do not 
emphasize planning for affordable housing but, rather, make available a 
builders remedy where less than ten percent of the housing stock is 
available to households with eighty percent of the area median income, 
with appeals from negative decisions subject to review under favorable 
presumptions.227 
California law requires that the state and local governments “have a 
responsibility . . . to facilitate the improvement and development of 
housing to make adequate provision for the housing needs of all economic 
segments of the community.”228  Required plans “shall make adequate 
provision for the existing and projected needs of all economic segments of 
the community.”229  The California provisions are a complex and top-down 
array of nested plans and requirements.230  California’s fair share laws have 
been described as “a useful foundation, [but] certainly only one piece of the 
puzzle, but in that piece they are not totally useless.”231 
2. Inclusionary Zoning 
Another device for fixing the affordable housing problem is 
“inclusionary zoning.”  Through one device or another, such as density 
bonuses, fast-track project approvals, or government mandates, developers 
are induced to provide housing at below-market prices.  “Density bonuses” 
means that developers who construct affordable units, i.e., units for sale or 
rent at below-market rates to government-approved individuals, may 
construct more units than the underlying zoning otherwise would permit.  
Courts have deemed such programs to be valid land-use regulations.232 
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However, in his influential article The Irony of ‘Inclusionary’ Zoning,233 
Robert Ellickson, described over thirty years ago why inclusionary 
programs are so problematic. 
These programs are essentially taxes on the production of new housing.  
The programs will usually increase general housing prices, a result which 
further limits the housing opportunities of moderate-income families.  In 
short, despite the assertions of inclusionary zoning proponents, most 
inclusionary ordinances are just another form of exclusionary practice.234 
Ellickson’s insight has its critics.  For instance, Barbara Ehrlich Kautz 
claims that Ellickson wrongfully asserted that “costs might be borne by 
other homebuyers or renters, the developer, or the landowner,” since 
programs could be designed that would create no additional costs for 
anyone; communities could provide density bonuses large enough to cover 
the entire cost of the inclusionary units.235  But unless one engages in 
magical thinking, these bonuses are “provided” by the community only as 
the direct result of restrictions imposed on existing owners in areas targeted 
for more intense development.  As such, the regulations provide 
governments with a strong incentive to overregulate so that they could 
subsequently and selectively relax the regulations to their benefit, and 
might constitute takings.236  Also, overregulation could have been used to 
achieve some other government purpose.  Again, the cost of a “free” choice 
is what someone must forego in order that it be provided.237 
3. Rent Control 
Rent control “historically has been among the most important 
interventions in housing markets.”238  It is a traditional, albeit controversial, 
way of providing affordable housing to sitting tenants and likely their 
successors.239  However, it has long been a truism among economists, 
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regardless of their political views, that “[a] ceiling on rents reduces the 
quantity and quality of housing” overall.240  Nevertheless skyrocketing 
rents facing tenants in California now militate toward the largest expansion 
in rent controls in decades.241  To the extent that such measures become 
law, they will surely benefit current tenants and provide some positive 
spillovers.  More importantly, however, they will further discourage the 
construction of rental housing and decrease housing affordability for all 
except entrenched and lucky renters. 
4. Affirmative Use of Eminent Domain 
In Kelo v. City of New London, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly 
interpreted government’s power of eminent domain to encompass takings 
for public benefit, as well as public use.242  Kelo continues to be regarded 
by many as impermissibly intruding on private property rights,243 and many 
states have imposed significant limitations on its use.244 
In addition to other concerns, the use of eminent domain has a 
disreputable past with regard to affordable housing and racial justice.  In 
Berman v. Parker,245 Justice Douglas declared for the Court that the use of 
eminent domain for the demolition of an entire neighborhood was 
warranted so that the area would not “revert again to a blighted or slum 
area, as though possessed of a congenital disease.”246  Responding to the 
“disease” metaphor, Professor Wendell Pritchett described how “blight” 
became regarded as a “public menace,” justifying the demolition of 
minority neighborhoods near the urban core and their replacement by 
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upscale housing and shops.247  Quoting Pritchett in his dissent in Kelo, 
Justice Thomas noted that “[u]rban renewal projects have long been 
associated with the displacement of blacks; [i]n cities across the country, 
urban renewal came to be known as ‘Negro removal.’”248 
A different, affirmative, use of eminent domain was suggested by 
Professors Carol Necole Brown and Serena Williams in connection with 
the rebuilding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.249  They argued that 
the creation of affordable housing through the use of eminent domain in 
conjunction with tax subsidies would prevent the creation of “affluent 
segregated neighborhoods” and preserve the “cultural complexity” that has 
marked the city.250  While eminent domain might be useful in other 
affordable housing situations, Professor John Lovett later noted that it has 
not been necessary in New Orleans.251 
5. Is Compelled Inclusionary Zoning a “Taking?” 
In California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose 
(“CBIA”),252 the California Supreme Court held in 2015 that a requirement 
that a developer sell fifteen percent of its on-site for-sale units at an 
affordable housing price was not an unconstitutional exaction violative of 
the takings clause and that this result was not dependent upon a showing 
that the affordable housing shortage that the ordinance was attempting to 
ameliorate was related to the development for which a permit was sought.  
Prior to Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,253 the city’s 
demand might be shrugged off as yet one more example of a type of 
incentive zoning or, more bluntly, “zoning for dollars.”254 
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In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,255 the Commission had 
conditioned a development approval for the enlargement of a beachfront 
home on the applicants’ granting a public easement of way along the dry 
sand behind the home.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that this demand 
would constitute an unconstitutional condition since no “essential nexus” 
existed between it and the Commission’s regulatory power to preserve the 
view of the ocean from the highway in front of the house.  In Dolan v. City 
of Tigard,256 where there was such a nexus, the Court further held that 
conditioning a development approval upon an exaction was permissible 
only where there was “rough proportionality” between it and the police 
power burden resulting from the development, as ascertained through an 
“individualized determination.”257  The Court extended the Nollan-Dolan 
principle in 2013, in Koontz.258  There, the Court held it applicable to 
exactions of cash as well as real property, and that the denial of a 
development permit because the landowner refused to accept the condition 
could “impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without 
just compensation.”259 
The California Supreme Court in CBIA distinguished Koontz by 
declaring the requirement that fifteen percent of units be sold at below-
market rate for affordable housing “does not require the developer to 
dedicate any portion of its property to the public or to pay any money to the 
public.”260  Rather, it “simply places a restriction on the way the developer 
may use its property by limiting the price for which the developer may 
offer some of its units for sale.”261 This reasoning, premised on the fact that 
developers can refrain from selling or renting units in residential 
subdivisions, seems inconsistent with recent U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.  In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,262 the Court held that 
the right to sell a legal product (there, raisins for table use) might be 
regulated, but is “not a special government benefit that the Government 
may hold hostage, to be ransomed by the waiver of constitutional 
protection.”263  Horne extended to personal property the Court’s earlier 
declaration in Nollan that “the right to build on one’s own property—even 
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though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting 
requirements—cannot remotely be described as a ‘government benefit.’”264 
Furthermore, the permit condition does require the developer to sell 
housing to a government designee at below-the-market price.  This 
functionally is no different than a mandatory bargain-sale to the 
government, with subsequent resale to the affordable housing buyer.  While 
the Supreme Court has not decided any exaction cases subsequent to 
Koontz, the issue posed by CBIA will continue to be pressed before it. 
D. Legislation Through Complex and Opaque Public-Private 
Bargains 
One way to develop comparative less expensive housing is through 
various public-private development schemes.  The notion is that 
government will guide the development so that it serves a public purpose 
and that private enterprise will provide the capital and expertise.  As the 
popular metaphor has it, public agencies will steer and private actors will 
row.265 
However, the public sector often pays inadequate attention to the costs 
of managing outside contractors.266  More disturbingly, the very 
information government needs to plan effectively often is in the hands of 
discerning developers who want to ensure profit from the government’s 
choice as the price of disclosure.267 
Given the general unwillingness of the public to pay for affordable 
housing or to suffer increased densification that would result from 
additional housing, various ways have been suggested for “grand bargains” 
and “citywide deals that promote housing.”268  However, as I have 
elaborated upon elsewhere,269 “grand bargains” often entrench the fruits of 
logrolling and crony capitalism in the form of property rights.  They also 
do not facilitate most effective land use, since developers still have strong 
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incentives to build projects most profitable instead of most responsive to 
community need.270 
E. Federal Subsidies and HUD Mandates 
Other ways to provide more affordable housing are based on federal 
subsidies and Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates.  
According to a 2015 Congressional Budget Office report,271 the previous 
year the federal government provided about fifty billion dollars in spending 
and tax subsidies that was specifically designated as housing assistance for 
low-income households.272  That assistance (as measured in 2014 dollars) 
increased by about fifteen percent between 2000 and 2003, but has 
“remained relatively stable” thereafter.273  Furthermore, unlike means-
tested programs like food stamps, which are intended to assist all eligible 
individuals, only a quarter of the twenty million eligible households receive 
federal housing assistance.274  As a result of lack of horizontal equity 
between those who benefit from housing assistance and those who do not, 
“some have likened it to a lottery.”275 
1. Federal Subsidy Programs 
The Congressional Budget Office’s 2015 report briefly discussed the 
federal housing subsidy programs for low-income housing.276  A classic 
way to provide for new urban development is through TIF, which utilizes 
federally tax-subsidized bonds and which is politically attractive because it 
brings money to cities without the need for local taxation.277  Under TIF, 
the bonds are issued to build projects, and the bonds are paid through 
diversion of the incremental real estate tax revenues resulting from the 
higher property valuations generated by the new construction.  However, 
there are considerable problems with TIF.  One is that local officials and 
developers seek “the blight that’s right”—areas bad enough to be approved 
for tax subsidies but good enough so that even non-subsidized private 
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projects might be sustainable.278  Another problem is that the “incremental” 
tax revenues syphoned off to repay the bonds are vitally needed for local 
public services, such as education, police, and fire protection. 
Another subsidy for development of affordable housing is the federal 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”).279  The LIHTC has been 
called “the largest and most important federal housing program in the 
United States . . . with a size and scale comparable to public housing and 
the federal Section 8 program.”280 
A recent study in Philadelphia found that “LIHTC-funded developments 
are more likely to be built in gentrifying neighborhoods because developers 
have strong market incentives to, and may be more likely to receive 
LIHTCs if they target gentrifying neighborhoods.”281  The author suggested 
that “building these developments in poor, non-gentrifying neighborhoods 
seems to be a more efficient use of government resources.”282 
One of the most expensive government subsidies for housing283 is the 
income tax mortgage interest deduction (“MID”) for interest payments on 
up to one million dollars million in primary or second-home mortgage 
debt.284  Professor Mechele Dickerson accurately noted that the MID 
“gives higher-income taxpayers an incentive to buy expensive homes, but 
is of little use to lower- or middle-income renters.”285  She also recognized, 
however, that public support for the MID, together with lobbying by 
interest groups such as homebuilders and lenders, makes change politically 
untenable.286  More than that, the advantage of government subsidies and 
other regulatory advantages attached to specific assets immediately is 
capitalized into the value of those assets.287  Intense political opposition to 
substantial tampering with the MID will come from owners of existing 
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homes who paid their sellers a higher price in order to reap the advantage 
of future income tax deductions and stand to lose considerable sums if they 
could not pass the same advantage to their own purchasers. 
2. Proposed HUD Rule on Housing Choice Vouchers 
The Federal Housing Choice Voucher program (also known as Section 8 
housing),288 assists eligible low- and moderate-income families obtain 
housing through HUD subsidies to private landlords.  HUD recently 
proposed rulemaking that would permit custom tailoring of maximum 
permissible rents to small neighborhoods.289 
Rather than determine rents on the basis of an entire metropolitan area, 
this rule proposes to determine rents on the basis of ZIP codes.  ZIP codes 
are small enough to reflect neighborhood differences and provide an 
easier method of comparing rents within one ZIP code to another ZIP 
code area within a metropolitan area . . . HUD believes that Small Area 
FMRs [Fair Market Rents] are more effective in helping families move to 
areas of higher opportunity and lower poverty.290 
One public housing authority that was authorized to experiment with the 
plan, the Chicago Housing Authority (“CHA”), selected “four lucky 
residents” to reside in a high-rise on North Lake Shore Drive that is “the 
second-most expensive in the city, with rents for a one-bedroom apartment 
approaching $3,000 a month, well beyond the reach of most Chicago 
residents.”291  The CHA’s intent was to “expand its housing voucher 
program so that more low-income residents can leave the city’s roughest 
neighborhoods and start a new life in places with low poverty and crime 
and close to good schools and jobs.”292 
Some landlords maintain it is a mistake to use scarce tax dollars to pay 
ultra-high rents for a fortunate few when more than 15,000 people sit on 
the CHA’s voucher waiting list.293  One added: “In a situation where you’re 
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dealing with a low-income person, do they really need a 25th-floor 
apartment with a lake view?  It just doesn’t make sense to me.”294 
The new HUD and Chicago approach raises a number of issues, 
including the debate between the “traditional” and “opportunities access” 
models of integration295 and concerns that government subsidies ought not 
to be used to leapfrog benefit recipients over moderate- and middle-income 
taxpayers.296 
3. Disparate Impact and Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
While the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) addressed the denial of housing 
opportunities on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin,”297 
“by the late 1970s, it was clear the FHA had the potential to serve as a tool 
for remedying exclusionary zoning, but the constraints of standing doctrine 
and the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent through circumstantial 
evidence somewhat curtailed the effectiveness of that tool.”298  Professor 
David Troutt argued that the FHA is the “least successful of the civil rights 
acts.”299  While it envisioned that “[o]vercoming discrimination that denied 
protected classes residency in high-opportunity areas would produce 
integrated communities of more equal opportunity, the problem has been 
that discrimination has matured in less recognizable ways and segregation 
has calcified, leading to more concentrated poverty, re-segregation and 
widening economic inequality.”300 
The notion that “discrimination has matured in less recognizable ways” 
undergirded the Supreme Court’s five to four decision in Texas Department 
of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project.301  
The ICP, a nonprofit corporation facilitating affordable housing, alleged 
that the Department had allocated too many federal low-income tax credits 
for construction of low-income housing in predominantly minority inner 
city areas and too few in predominantly white suburbs.302  Texas asserted 
that the appropriate standard of review was “disparate treatment,” whereas 
IPC asserted it was “disparate impact.”  “In contrast to a disparate-
treatment case, where a ‘plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a 
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discriminatory intent or motive,’ a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact 
claim challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on 
minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.”303  The 
district court had concluded that ICP had established a prima facie case of 
disparate impact.304 
In holding that disparate-impact claims were cognizable under the Fair 
Housing Act, Justice Kennedy stressed America’s history of segregated 
housing,305 that Congress was aware when it amended the FHA in 1988 
that the nine Courts of Appeals to have considered disparate-impact claims 
unanimously held them cognizable by the courts306 and that recognition of 
disparate-impact claims was “consistent with the FHA’s central purpose 
[to] eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation’s 
economy.”307 
However, Justice Kennedy stressed it would raise “serious constitutional 
questions” if disparate-impact liability could be “imposed based solely on a 
showing of a statistical disparity.”308  Noting the principal dissent by 
Justice Alito, he added that the “limitations on disparate-impact liability 
discussed here are also necessary to protect potential defendants against 
abusive disparate-impact claims.”309  These qualifications have been 
described as “promulgat[ing] terms for a peace settlement between 
disparate impact and equal protection.”310  The nuances in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion suggest that applying the disparate-impact standard 
might not be without difficulty.311 
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Three weeks after Inclusive Communities was handed down, HUD 
promulgated its rules on Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing 
(“AFFH”).312  These rules included an affordable housing component. 
HUD’s rule recognizes the role of place-based strategies, including 
economic development to improve conditions in high poverty 
neighborhoods, as well as preservation of the existing affordable housing 
stock, including HUD-assisted housing, to help respond to the 
overwhelming need for affordable housing. 
* * * 
A balanced approach would include, as appropriate, the removal of 
barriers that prevent people from accessing housing in areas of 
opportunity, the development of affordable housing in such areas . . . 313 
Pursuant to the AFFH final rules, jurisdictions receiving HUD funding 
will be provided with data and tools for conducting the analysis of fair 
housing issues specific to their area and are asked by HUD to assess their 
performance and devise goals based on data and analysis.314  Metrics and 
technics for doing so are now being developed and assessed.315  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases raising 
the issue of whether a city alleging that it has suffered consequential 
damages has standing to allege discriminatory practices under the Fair 
Housing Act.316 
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4. Affordable Housing Mandates Will be Difficult to Apply and Enforce 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a detailed analysis of the 
substantial volume of litigation culminating in Inclusive Communities,317 
the HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,”318 and 
the administrative interpretations and cases that surely will follow.  
However, a few cautions are in order. 
Fair housing advocate Thomas Silverstein reviewed attempts in recent 
decades to reverse land-use regulations leading to exclusionary housing and 
noted that none “have fundamentally reshaped how people in communities 
on the ground think about land-use regulation.  As evidenced by the 
rhetoric of [some] local policy-makers . . . many continue to see 
exclusionary zoning as something that is natural, inevitably local, and 
supportive of individual property rights.”319  He added that the New Jersey 
Fair Housing Act is “in some ways the gold standard for state law 
innovations,” but “that system was the result of and continues to be fraught 
with litigation.”320  “That conflict is both a reflection of its effectiveness, 
which has riled exclusionary suburbs, and its complexity, which has even 
baffled supporters at times.”321 
Another advocate, Professor Tim Iglesias, added: 
Sometimes we yearn for affordable housing and fair housing to be front- 
burner issues, but as the old saying goes: “be careful what you wish for.”  
In my view, we are not a “post-racial society” in any meaningful sense.  
Race, income, and integration are still difficult and volatile topics among 
legislators, opinion leaders, and among the general public.  Increased 
proposed use of inclusionary zoning is likely to incite a controversial 
public debate about “forced integration.”  If we are not ready for this 
debate, it could hurt both affordable housing and fair housing in general 
as well as increase local opposition to inclusionary zoning ordinances.  In 
particular, if the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (“AFFH”) 
regulation is finalized, we should expect much more critical attention to 
integration.322 
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Although the “regnant scholarly consensus” is that the Fair Housing Act 
is “tepid, toothless, and ineffective,”323 Professor Jonathan Zasloff asserted 
that during its first decade strong enforcement by the Department of 
Justice, especially with respect to realtors, brought about significant 
success.324  It is instructive to recall that HUD Secretary George Romney, 
formerly a moderate Republican governor of Michigan, was a supporter of 
fair housing, but his attempts to use subsidized housing programs to 
promote housing integration in the suburbs were not in line with Nixon 
Administration policy and he was forced out of office.325  Significantly, 
“[t]here is little evidence that top Nixon officials encouraged fair housing 
enforcement, but they basically left the Civil Rights Division alone.”326 
It seems clear that implementing Inclusive Communities and the HUD 
AFFH regulations will take a considerable and sustained effort by the 
Department of Justice, HUD, and other federal agencies.  Much will 
depend on whether President Trump and his administration would be 
desirous of pursuing those goals.  
Testimony at Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ confirmation hearings was 
sharply divided regarding his commitment to civil rights.327  Likewise, 
when HUD Secretary Ben Carson was a presidential candidate at the time 
Inclusive Communities was handed down and HUD issued its AFFH final 
regulations, he spoke of those developments disapprovingly: 
Remember busing, that brilliant social experiment that was to usher in a 
new era of racial utopia in America?  Undaunted by the failed socialist 
experiments of the 1980s, the Obama administration has recently 
implemented a new Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) rule designed to “desegregate” housing by withholding funds from 
communities that fail to demonstrate their projects “affirmatively further” 
fair housing.”328 
Dr. Carson further asserted: 
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These government-engineered attempts to legislate racial equality create 
consequences that often make matters worse.  There are reasonable ways 
to use housing policy to enhance the opportunities available to lower-
income citizens, but based on the history of failed socialist experiments in 
this country, entrusting the government to get it right can prove downright 
dangerous.329 
Federal judges, too, will have a substantial role in shaping the outcome 
of affirmatively furthering fair housing efforts.  Even under a “disparate 
treatment” analysis, subtle and contestable judgments will be required.  
Inclusive Communities cautioned: 
Disparate-impact liability mandates the “removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers,” not the displacement of valid governmental 
policies.  The FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to 
reorder their priorities.  Rather, the FHA aims to ensure that those 
priorities can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory 
effects or perpetuating segregation.330 
Inclusive Communities added that “[a]n important and appropriate means 
of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited is to give 
housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the 
valid interest served by their policies.”331 
Balancing the various goals of the FHA against other important local 
needs necessarily implicates federal executive and judicial review of local 
land-use determinations.  Historically, the federal government has not 
generally intruded on local land-use decisions.332  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opined that federal courts are not the “grand 
mufti” of land use.333  The Fourth Circuit likewise pronounced, 
“[r]esolving the routine land-use disputes that inevitably and constantly 
arise among developers, local residents, and municipal officials is simply 
not the business of the federal courts . . . .”334 
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The Trump administration is likely to appoint a record number of federal 
judges.335  It is reasonable to speculate that they would not be inclined 
towards a broad view of federal land use regulatory powers.  It is 
instructive in this regard to consider the 2016 Republican Platform:  
Zoning decisions have always been, and must remain, under local control.  
The current Administration is trying to seize control of the zoning process 
through its Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regulation.  It threatens 
to undermine zoning laws in order to socially engineer every community 
in the country.  While the federal government has a legitimate role in 
enforcing nondiscrimination laws, this regulation has nothing to do with 
proven or alleged discrimination and everything to do with hostility to the 
self-government of citizens.336 
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause337 is not a “poor relation” to other constitutional rights,338 
the Court has set its protections at a fairly low level with regard to alleged 
“regulatory takings” that result from stringent regulations.339  Even then, a 
practical caveat is in order.  Professors James Krier and Stewart Sterk 
recently noted that the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence is a “body of 
doctrine [that] sets a constitutional bottom.”340 
States must protect property at least as much as the Court’s rules decree, 
but they are free in principle to protect it more.  Moreover, state courts 
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are able, in practice, to protect it less, because the Supreme Court has 
developed ripeness and preclusion rules that limit the ability of lower 
federal courts to oversee their work, and because the Court can review 
only a fraction of takings cases in any event.341 
Those “ripeness and preclusion” rules342 apply only to takings and 
closely related substantive due process claims343 and not to “constitutional 
torts” related to free speech, racial and religious discrimination, and other 
constitutionally protected rights.344 
In a somewhat analogous situation, a clear federal policy regarding local 
land-use decisions was enunciated in the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUPIA”).345  Courts are required to apply 
strict scrutiny in reviewing local land-use decisions that arguably impose a 
substantial burden on religious exercise if those decisions involve 
“individualized assessments” of the proposed use of the parcel.346  While 
alleged discrimination against religious uses of land always has been 
susceptible to attack under the Free Exercise347 and Equal Protection 
Clauses,348 some supporters of RLUPIA grounded it in claims that the 
underlying nature of land-use regulation lacks objective standards, and 
granting local officials with “virtually unlimited discretion” thus “readily 
lends itself to religious discrimination.”349 
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Unlike RLUPIA, neither Inclusive Communities350 nor HUD’s new 
affirmative regulations351 purports to impose strict scrutiny.352  It is 
possible, of course, that the executive branch and the courts will apply 
affordable housing mandates zealously and might use RLUPIA as a model 
in such efforts.  It might be that the filing of a few highly publicized cases 
and HUD withdrawals of housing funding would serve as a sufficient 
incentive for localities to conform their conduct to advancing fair housing.  
On the other hand, such actions might redouble the efforts of opponents 
who see broad-based attempts to impose income and racial integration as 
“social engineering.”353 
Professor Lee Anne Fennell wrote that a driver of segregation has been 
the desires and search patterns of homeseekers.354  This practice might 
partially be thwarted through devices such as interactive search tools that 
employ algorithms to provide home seekers with results from 
neighborhoods similar to those they are searching, but in more integrated 
neighborhoods.355 
Fennell’s speculations seem to be an example of government “nudging” 
of individuals, with the ambiguity associated with soft paternalism.356  But, 
for proponents, this might be insufficient, and  
nudges faced with firm opposition must be supported by a web of 
regulation and government marketing so strong that the cost of cutting 
through that web exceeds the benefits . . . . Changing the default is not 
enough; regulation must also control the framing of the default and the 
opt-out process.357 
                                                                                                                 
 350. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015). 
 351. HUD Final Rule on “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” 80 Fed. Reg 42,272 
(July 16, 2015) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.). 
 352. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text (discussing cautions against an over-
zealous approach in Inclusive Communities; HUD Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 42,272 
(noting that HUD “does not mandate specific outcomes for the planning process[,]” but 
rather, “recognizing the importance of local decisionmaking” helps HUD program 
participants “to be better positioned to fulfill their obligation to affirmatively further fair 
housing.”). 
 353. See Iglesias, supra note 1, at 593 & n.34 (noting Patrik Jonsson, ‘Fair’ Housing or 
‘Social Engineering’? HUD Proposal Stirs Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 9, 
2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2013/0809/Fair-housing-or-social-engineering-
HUD-proposal-stirs-controversy [https://perma.cc/FRJ3-36XG] (reporting fears that the 
proposed AFFH rule would “force communities to diversify in ways that may hurt local 
property values, their tax bases, and their overall economies”)). 
 354. Fennell, supra note 35. 
 355.  Id. at 53-56. 
 356. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 39. 
 357. Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 
1229 (2013). 
354 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
In the somewhat unlikely event that the executive branch or the courts 
opt for far-reaching change, they might adopt the advice of Professor Dan 
Kahan, who suggested that enforcing statutory requirements in the face of 
societal “sticky norms” to the contrary might best be done through the 
imposition of only mild sanctions, at first, until public attitudes change.358 
5. Conflicting Value Systems and the Idea of “Fairness” 
One fundamental source of social tension, as interpreted by the noted 
sociologist Jonathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind,359 is that liberals and 
conservatives have different moral “palates.”  Liberals have two values, 
“care” for the needs of others and “fairness” (defined as “equality”).  
Conservatives are concerned equally with five values: “care,” “fairness” 
(defined very differently, as people reaping what they sow), “loyalty,” 
“authority,” and “sanctity.”360  Housing in good neighborhoods, then, is 
either a right that all people should be able to enjoy (fairness as equality), 
or, conversely, a reward for diligent effort (fairness as just deserts).  
Howard Husock exemplifies the latter view in claiming that socioeconomic 
status rightfully is the primary determinant of where people live. 
[F]amilies strive, save and move up the steps of the economic ladder.  
When they do, the symbol of their achievement, as well as its reward, is 
the neighborhood or municipality in which they live. 
Scattering subsidized housing breaks the unspoken rules of housing, and 
thus inspires bitter opposition.  Public housing built in affluent or blue-
collar neighborhoods allows families (or individuals) who have not 
followed the same route of upward mobility to share the reward.  What is 
undermined is a defining aspect of middle-class life: accepting the 
discipline of work and family, as well as law and order, to attain, after a 
time, comfortable and secure surroundings.361 
Discussions of “equality” and “merit” often neglect, on one hand, the 
problem of accounting for “work” in the “informal economy”362 and, on the 
other, structural changes that make it difficult for children to rise above the 
status of their parents.363 
Professor George Wright asserted that “the most crucial Supreme Court 
discussions on equal protection bear only modest indication, either direct or 
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indirect, explicit or implicit, and however diluted, of any of the leading 
historic, traditional, or contemporary understandings of the idea of equality 
itself.”364  It might be that litigation based on Inclusive Communities365 or 
the HUD “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” regulations366 ultimately 
will push the Supreme Court toward addressing that basic question. 
F. Reducing Government Barriers to New Market-Rate Housing 
It is perhaps intrinsic to democracy that people demand goods despite 
the fact that their demands are inconsistent.  Also, existing voters are 
advocates of what Richard Babcock referred to as “municipal 
primogeniture,” the right of the first residents of a community to assert its 
character by placing the burden of undesirable uses upon others.367  As 
Washington Post housing reporter Emily Badger summed up: 
San Francisco can have a dynamic economy and charming neighborhoods 
unmarred by new construction and denser housing.  But it can’t have both 
of those things without paying a steep cost in rent (and without pushing 
lower-wage workers out).  Other cities face a similar fate if their 
economies boom but their housing construction does not.368 
In cities like San Francisco, amenity-based restrictions, such as historic 
preservation, environmental preservation, and height ceilings “add up, 
across a city, even if they’re well-intentioned.  The affordability issue will 
rear its head.”369  Likewise, mandates for strict urban growth containment, 
as in Portland, Oregon “probably do[] cause higher housing prices.”370 
Indeed, while the high tech boom often is blamed for the extraordinarily 
high rents in San Francisco, in fact, rents have risen at a remarkably steady 
6.6 percent per year since 1956, or 2.5% after inflation.371  The California 
average home price of $440,000 is 2.5 times the national average of 
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$180,000; the average monthly rent of $1240 is 50% higher than the rest of 
the country ($840).372 
Two leading land-use economists, Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, 
have concluded, 
America does not uniformly face a housing affordability crisis.  In the 
majority of places, land costs are low (or at least reasonable) and housing 
prices are close to (or below) the costs of new construction.  In the places 
where housing is quite expensive, building restrictions appear to have 
created these high prices.373   
“As demand to live in a particular suburb or city outstrips the existing 
housing stock, two things can happen:  more housing gets built to meet the 
demand, or prices get bid up to ration the existing stock.”374 
In fact, the price of housing and individual inability to afford adequate 
housing are analytically separate and distinct issues.  As Glaeser and 
Gyourko note: 
In general, housing advocates have confused the role of housing prices 
with the role of poverty.  Both housing costs and poverty matter for the 
well-being of American citizens, but only one of these factors is a housing 
issue per se.  Certainly, the country should pursue sensible antipoverty 
policies, but if housing is not unusually expensive, these policies should 
not be put forward as a response to a housing crisis.  To us, a housing 
affordability crisis means that housing is expensive relative to its 
fundamental costs of production—not that people are poor.  Therefore, we 
will focus entirely on housing prices, not on the distribution of income. 
A second key concept in thinking about a housing affordability crisis is 
the relevant benchmark for housing costs.  Affordability advocates often 
argue for the ability to pay (for example, some percentage of income) as a 
relevant benchmark, but this again confuses poverty with housing prices.  
We believe that a more sensible benchmark is the physical construction 
costs of housing.  If we believe that there is a housing crisis, then 
presumably the correct housing response would be to build more housing.  
Yet the social cost of that new housing can never be lower than the cost of 
construction.  For there to be a “social” gain from new construction, 
housing must be priced appreciably above the cost of new construction.375 
Jason Furman, former Chair of the President’s Council of Economic 
Advisors, recently observed that “excessive . . . land-use or zoning 
regulations have consequences that go beyond the housing market to 
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impede mobility and thus contribute to rising inequality and declining 
productivity growth.”376  Enrico Moretti’s The New Geography of Jobs 
provides a more extensive discussion of how land-use regulations restrict 
economic development and income mobility.377 
Building upon data derived by Paul Emrath,378 the National Association 
of Home Builders reported that “average cost for home builders to comply 
with regulations for new home construction has increased by nearly 30% 
over the last five years.”379  Emrath added that “[i]t really makes it hard to 
satisfy the lower end of the market, which is a lot of first-time buyers.”380  
A further indication of this is that “[a]cross the U.S., new home 
construction has remained at historic lows throughout the housing recovery 
of the last five years, but the share of starter homes priced below $200,000 
has dwindled more than any other segment, according to U.S. Census 
data.”381 
Part of the problem of expensive regulation that reduces housing 
construction is complex and strict environmental regulation, sometimes 
compounded by courts.  A pertinent example is the rejection by the 
California Supreme Court of the Environmental Impact Report for the Los 
Angeles County’s planned Newhall Ranch community, which would house 
58,000 people.382  The project had been approved by Los Angeles County 
twelve years earlier and had been affirmed as sufficient by the Court of 
Appeal.383  Justice Corrigan dissented, concluding that “[t]he majority’s 
contrary conclusion is inconsistent with our deferential standard of 
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review.”384  The dissent of Justice Chin emphasized not only the 
extensiveness of the Report and its review by numerous agencies and lower 
courts, but also the harm that would flow from delay.  
This litigation has already delayed implementing the EIR some five years 
or so.  Now this court is sending the case back to the Court of Appeal.  
Among other things, it is permitting the project opponents to relitigate 
some already decided issues even though the Court of Appeal fully 
rejected the arguments the first time . . . .  At some point after that [appeal 
ends], the EIR will have to be revised, with the necessary period of public 
comment, etc . . . . Then it is predictable that yet more litigation will 
follow the finalization of the new EIR.  Given the glacial pace of 
litigation, this will easily take years. 
And it gets worse.  The majority strongly hints that the time will come 
when compliance with goals established for the year 2020 will not be 
sufficient, and the proposed project will have to meet some different goals 
established for the future beyond 2020.  By the time this litigation ends, 
and the new EIR is prepared and finalized, we will be much closer to 
2020 than when the current EIR was finalized in 2010.  Delay can become 
its own reward for project opponents.  Delay the project long enough and 
it has to meet new targets, and then perhaps new targets after that.  All 
this is a recipe for paralysis.  But CEQA [the California Environmental 
Quality Act] is not meant to cause paralysis.  Carefully planned green 
communities are needed to accommodate California’s growing 
population.  CEQA ensures the informed planning, but it does not prohibit 
the planned communities.385 
CONCLUSION 
The problem of “affordable housing” is a battle of competing metaphors.  
For advocates of housing for those with low- and moderate-incomes, it 
focuses on those socioeconomic groups to the exclusion of others, and 
elides the quite distinct problems of high housing prices and poverty.386  
Affordable housing also is closely linked with the problem of “fair 
housing,” which entails amelioration of racial exclusion through some 
balance of strategies involving classic integration and provision of access 
to opportunities.  Those viewing these issues through the lens of the local 
polity and its entrenched economic and political interests frame them 
differently from those who do not.387  Maintaining rootedness in existing 
communities is another concern, although interest groups fighting 
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gentrification and those fighting change in upper-income communities 
frame the issues quite differently.388  High housing prices exacerbate 
poverty and exclusion and harm regional economies and the national 
economy.389  While all of these separate problems interact in a myriad of 
ways, we should be aware that metaphors leading to inconsistent patterns 
of issue conflation do not lead to effective solutions.390 
The removal of barriers to what we term “affordable housing” might be 
accomplished through an unlikely democratic expression of broad popular 
will.  However, more likely are complex and opaque bargains among 
legislators and interest groups or active micro-management by federal or 
state agencies and courts, all of which are often apt to be largely counter-
productive as well as intrusive. 
The metaphors of “affordable housing” collectively serve largely to 
obfuscate both issues and possible solutions. 
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